Islamic law — fiqh — is one of the most intellectually rigorous disciplines in all of human scholarship, and the differences that arose among the four great schools of jurisprudence are far from arbitrary. Continuing the Studies in Islam series on Islamic law, this episode examines the linguistic heart of scholarly disagreement among the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali madhabs. All four schools stand in unambiguous agreement that the Qur’an and Sunnah are the supreme foundations of Islamic guidance, and all four accept the consensus of the Companions (ijma’) and analogical reasoning (qiyas) as secondary sources. Yet they still differ — and understanding why they differ is not merely an academic exercise. It is an act of intellectual sincerity toward Allah’s deen, a safeguard against blind imitation, and a means by which every Muslim can deepen their relationship with authentic Islamic faith and practice.
Three Linguistic Roots of Scholarly Difference in Fiqh
Language is not a static vessel — it is a living, layered medium, and the classical Arabic of the Qur’an and Sunnah carries depths that gave even the greatest scholars pause. Scholars identify three primary linguistic reasons why the great imams arrived at different legal rulings from the same sacred texts. The first is where a single Arabic word carries more than one literal meaning. A clear example is the term quru’, used in Surah al-Baqarah (2:228) to describe the waiting period (iddah) for divorced women: “Divorced women shall wait for three quru’.” The word simultaneously means the actual menstrual period and the interval of purity between menstruations. Imams Malik, al-Shafi’i, and Ahmad held it meant the period of purity, while Imam Abu Hanifah ruled it referred to menstruation itself — a difference that determines precisely when a woman’s waiting period concludes and affects her right to remarriage. When authentic hadith evidence from Sahih Muslim, including narrations from Aisha (radhi Allahu anha), is examined closely, the textual case supports Abu Hanifah’s position, demonstrating that the Sunnah of the Prophet ﷺ is always the ultimate arbiter. The second linguistic source of difference involves words that carry both a literal and a figurative meaning. The Arabic word lams (to touch) appears in Surah an-Nisa (4:43), instructing that if one has “touched women” and finds no water, tayammum (dry ablution) may be performed. Imam al-Shafi’i took this literally: any skin-to-skin contact between a man and a woman invalidates wudu. Imam Malik required that the touch be pleasurable to break wudu. Imam Abu Hanifah, supported by an authentic narration that the Prophet ﷺ kissed one of his wives then led the congregational prayer without renewing his wudu, concluded that lams here is figurative — symbolising sexual relations, not incidental contact. The third source of linguistic difference lies in grammatical ambiguity: the same preposition can carry different meanings depending on its context in a sentence. The Arabic preposition ila (up to) can mean “up to but not including” or “up to and including,” as illustrated by comparing the fasting verse (2:187) with the verse driving sinners to hellfire (19:86). When applied to the ablution verse commanding Muslims to wash their arms up to the elbows, this ambiguity was resolved not through grammatical debate alone, but through the Prophet’s ﷺ own practice — water dripping from his elbows as he made wudu — conclusively establishing that the elbows themselves must be included. This episode also carries a sobering warning: scholarly minimum-threshold discussions, if lifted from their original context by those unfamiliar with their purpose, can deform practice entirely. Among some followers of the Shafi’i school, a linguistic discussion about the minimum number of hairs that constitutes “wiping the head” led ordinary people to simply tap a few hairs at the front of the forehead — far removed from what the Prophet ﷺ actually demonstrated.
“If the hadith is saheeh, then that is my madhhab.” — A statement attributed to each of the four great Imams, preserved in the classical scholarship of Islam, reminding every generation that authentic evidence always supersedes scholarly opinion.
- Words with multiple literal meanings (e.g., quru’): Scholars differed on which literal meaning to apply; authentic hadith narrations from the Companions resolve the dispute.
- Words with literal vs. figurative meanings (e.g., lams): The Prophet’s ﷺ actions — kissing his wife then leading prayer without renewing wudu — showed that “touching” in this context signifies sexual relations, not accidental contact.
- Grammatical ambiguity (e.g., the preposition ila): The Prophet’s ﷺ demonstrated wudu practice confirmed that washing the arms includes the elbows themselves.
- The Sunnah is the supreme referee: In every case of linguistic dispute, the Companions’ understanding and the Prophet’s ﷺ actions provide the decisive evidence.
- Scholarly disagreement is principled, not arbitrary: The four imams engaged in rigorous ijtihad; where they acknowledged the possibility of error, they deferred to stronger evidence.
- Beware of decontextualised rulings: Internal scholarly discussions about legal minimums were never intended to replace the Prophet’s ﷺ actual practice — applying them without understanding their origin distorts worship.
Following the Madhabs with Wisdom: Between Taqleed and Ijtihad
The Permanent Committee of Senior Scholars (al-Lajnah al-Da’imah) has addressed the question of following a school of law with admirable clarity: it is not obligatory for every Muslim in every situation. Those with the knowledge and tools to derive rulings directly from the Qur’an and Sunnah are encouraged to do so. Those who cannot are permitted — and in many cases obliged — to consult a trustworthy scholar whose knowledge, piety, and righteousness they have verified. What must never be forgotten is that none of the four great imams called people to follow them — they called people to the Qur’an and Sunnah, and they criticised their own students when those students placed their opinions above authentic narrations. The madhhab of Imam Abu Hanifah spread across the Muslim world in part through its adoption by the Ottoman Caliphate over six centuries, yet that historical reach does not render every ruling within it more correct than the other schools. The truth belongs to the evidence — wherever it leads.
“None of them called people to follow his madhhab, or was partisan in following it, or obliged anyone else to act in accordance with it. Rather they used to call people to follow the Qur’an and Sunnah.” — Fataawa al-Lajnah al-Da’imah, 5/56
The study of fiqh is ultimately a study in humility — humility before the vastness of divine revelation, and humility before the towering scholarship of those who gave their lives to understand it. When we trace scholarly differences to their linguistic and evidential roots, we do not diminish the four imams; we honour them, for their methodology was always to return to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ when certainty was needed. For every Muslim seeking spiritual guidance and clarity in practice today, this episode offers a powerful reminder: the diversity within Islamic jurisprudence is not a weakness of the faith — it is a testament to the richness of a living tradition that has always placed sincere engagement with divine revelation above blind conformity. Seek knowledge, ask scholars you trust, and know that the path to Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala is illuminated by those who wrestled honestly with His words and the lived example of His final Prophet ﷺ.
